

**Errata for
Heather Stoll, 2011, “Dimensionality and the Number of Parties in Legislative
Elections”, *Party Politics* 17 (3).**

1. Equations 5 and 6 are each missing an addition sign between the second and third terms on the right-hand side. They should read as follows:

$$\text{ENEP}_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{DIM}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \text{MAJ}_{i,t} + \beta_3 \text{DIM} \times \text{MAJ}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (5)$$

$$\text{DIM}_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{NEWPARTIES}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \text{MAJ}_{i,t} + \beta_3 \text{NEWPARTIES} \times \text{MAJ}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (6)$$

2. There are some mistakes in the listing of the coding-category cleavage associations. In the Appendix, “Measuring raw ideological dimensionality,” on p. 422-423, the coding category-cleavage associations for the socioeconomic dimension should be as follows:

PER401, “Free Enterprise”; PER402, “Incentives”; PER403, “Market Regulation”; PER404, “Economic Planning”; PER405, “Corporatism”; PER406, “Protectionism, Positive”; PER407, “Protectionism, Negative”; PER408, “Economic Goals”; PER409, “Keynesian Demand Management”; PER410, “Productivity”; PER411, “Technology and Infrastructure”; PER412, “Controlled Economy”; PER413, “Nationalization”; PER414, “Economic Orthodoxy”; PER415, “Marxist Analysis”; PER503, “Social Justice”; PER504, “Welfare State Expansion”; PER505, “Welfare State Limitation”; PER506, “Educational Expansion”; PER507, “Educational Limitation”; PER701, “Labor Groups, Positive”; PER702, “Labor Groups, Negative”; and PER704, “Middle Class and Professional Groups”.

[PER405 was mistakenly omitted from the list in the Appendix, and categories PER406-PER408 were accordingly mislabeled; “Middle Class and Professional Groups” was also mistakenly labeled as PER703 when the coding category is actually PER704.]

Finally, to clarify, when p. 423 states that the democratic-authoritarian cleavage is only considered salient for Greece, Portugal, and Spain, that means that for all other countries, the salience of this cleavages is coded as zero.

3. For Greece, Portugal, and Spain, a mistake was made in the calculation of Molinar’s N in the original data processing code. However, perhaps not surprisingly given the small number of cases involved and the relatively minor impact of the error (for example, for the most affected country, Spain, the correlation between the core original and corrected measures is 0.66), the correlations between the original measures and the revised measures are extremely high: between approximately (to two significant digits) 0.94 and 0.95. Also perhaps not surprisingly, given these high correlations, the substantive conclusions reported in the article are little changed; the only change of note is that *more* support is found for H2 in that the interaction term in Model 5 is now statistically significant, as is the marginal effect under permissive electoral systems (although it remains substantively insignificant). Revised (corrected) versions of the measures are available in the replication data set. Revised (corrected) versions of the article’s Tables 1-3 appear below.

Regarding the correlations reported on p. 411-412, using our revised (corrected) measure, the correlation between our measure and Nyblade's measure of effective ideological dimensionality is 0.14; the correlation between our measure and Nyblade's measure of issue dimensionality is 0.22; the correlation between our (averaged by country) measure and Lijphart's measure is 0.011.

Country	Raw Issue (Nyblade)	Raw Ideological	Effective Ideological (Nyblade)	Effective Ideological (Lijphart)
Australia	NA	1.4	NA	1.5
Austria	17	1.5	2.7	1.5
Belgium	21	2.0	2.9	3.0
Canada	NA	1.4	NA	1.5
Denmark	16	1.3	2.7	2.5
Finland	14	1.3	3.0	3.5
France	24	1.7	3.1	2.5
Germany	18	1.6	2.8	3.0
Greece	17	2.2	3.0	1.5
Iceland	15	1.2	3.0	2.0
Ireland	15	1.3	2.8	1.5
Israel	NA	2.2	NA	3.0
Italy	19	1.4	2.9	3.0
Japan	NA	1.5	NA	2.5
Luxembourg	17	1.5	2.7	2.0
Netherlands	22	1.6	2.8	3.0
New Zealand	NA	1.3	NA	1.0
Norway	21	1.5	2.7	3.0
Portugal	16	1.6	3.0	2.5
Spain	21	1.8	2.8	2.5
Sweden	13	1.2	2.4	2.5
Switzerland	NA	1.7	NA	3.0
United Kingdom	23	1.5	3.0	1.5
United States	NA	2.3	NA	1.0

Table 1: The average (post-World War II) party-defined dimensionality of political competition using four measures, all rounded to two significant digits. “NA” indicates the unavailability of a measure.

Model	Effective Number of Electoral Parties				Raw Dimensionality	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Dimensionality	Raw Ideology	Raw Issue	Raw Ideology	Raw Issue	Raw Ideology	Raw Issue
Intercept	3.2*** (0.27)	3.2*** (0.33)	3.2*** (0.29)	2.9*** (0.38)	1.5*** (0.039)	17*** (0.043)
Raw Dimensionality	0.47** (0.19)	0.049*** (0.019)	0.72*** (0.20)	0.076*** (0.023)		
Majoritarian			0.20 (0.41)	-2.3 (1.7)	-0.023 (0.063)	7.4*** (1.2)
Raw Dimensionality × Majoritarian			-0.97*** (0.28)	0.050 (0.070)		
New Parties					0.035** (0.018)	0.40** (0.17)
New Parties × Majoritarian					-0.041* (0.021)	-0.076 (0.27)
N	347	237	347	237	217	171
Root MSE	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3	0.38	4.0
R ²	0.022	0.030	0.23	0.077	0.027	0.28

Table 2: The estimated OLS coefficients for Models 1-6; Newey-West robust standard errors appear in parentheses. The dependent variable for Models 1-4 is the effective number of electoral parties, while the dependent variable for Models 5 and 6 is the raw dimensionality. Significance codes are for two-sided tests, all calculated prior to rounding to two significant digits: 0.01, ***; 0.05, **; 0.10, *.

Model	Dimensionality	Type of Electoral System	
		Permissive	Restrictive
3	Raw Ideological	0.72 [0.33, 1.1]	-0.25 [-0.64, 0.14]
4	Raw Issue	0.076 [0.030, 0.12]	0.13 [-0.0038, 0.25]
5	Raw Ideological	0.035 [0.00035, 0.070]	-0.0059 [-0.028, 0.017]
6	Raw Issue	0.40 [0.070, 0.74]	0.33 [-0.082, 0.74]

Table 3: The estimated marginal effect for permissive (non-majoritarian) and restrictive (majoritarian) electoral systems. For Models 3 and 4, this is the marginal effect of raw dimensionality on the effective number of electoral parties; for Models 5 and 6, it is the marginal effect of the number of new parties on the raw dimensionality. Ninety-five percent two-sided confidence intervals appear in brackets.